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Careful readers of Thomas Aquinas' work soon 
become aware of his liking for illustrating all kinds of 
argument by using the same or similar examples. This 
method actually makes the researcher's task easier, as we 
can set out from the assumption that the subjects explained 
using the same examples are in some way interconnected. 
Moreover, if we look further into the history of these cases, 
we often find that they themselves provide an important 
key to unlock major problems that may arise. This is the 
case when we seek out all the occasions on which Aquinas 
uses a particular example to shed light on the controversial 
subject of the immutability of natural law. The example in 
question has a long history, going back to the first book of 
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Plato's Republic; Aquinas usually transcribes it as 
depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso, although 
some variations also occur.  We shall first look at the 
context in which Plato situates this idea, then go on to 
examine the occasions on which Aquinas draws on it: in 
the Summa, when discussing the question as to whether the 
natural law is the same for everyone; in his Commentary on 
the Nicomachean Ethics, when he explains in what sense 
natural law may change, and in what sense it remains the 
same; and finally, where he examines the virtues of gnome 
and epieikeia, also in the Summa. 
 
 I. PLATO'S TEXT: REPUBLIC 331C-332A 
The first book of the Republic, the Thrasymachus 
deals in a general way with justice. After Cephalus, the old 
man, speaks, Socrates responds by asking for an 
explanation of the definition of justice given by the former: 
An admirable sentiment, Cephalus, said I. But speaking of this 
very thing, justice, are we to affirm thus without qualification that it is 
truthtelling and paying back what one has received from anyone, or 
may these very actions sometimes be just and sometimes unjust? I 
mean, for example, as everyone I presume would admit, if one took 
over weapons from a friend who was in his right mind and then the 
lender should go mad and demand them back, that we ougth not to 
return them in that case and that he who did so return them would not 
be acting justly –not yet would he who chose to speak nothing but the 
truth to one who was in that state1. 
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This is the example that Aquinas was to appropriate 
and apply to the issues mentioned above concerning the 
immutability of natural law and the nature of justice: 
depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso. It is therefore 
interesting to analyse this with care. Above all, Socrates' 
query "Are we to affirm thus without qualification that it is 
truthtelling and paying back what one has received from 
anyone, or may these very actions sometimes be just and 
sometimes unjust?". In this context, it is useful to bear in 
mind a nuance in the Greek text which the English 
translation does not always make clear. What Socrates says 
is not that the actions of returning what is owed and telling 
the truth may sometimes be just or unjust. What he says is 
that these actions are sometimes done justly, sometimes 
unjustly.2   
As we can infer from the text, the counterpoint is set 
up between an excessively "casuistical" view of justice, as 
shown by the condition "in all cases", and a view of justice 
as a "way of acting", which is reflected in the use of 
adverbs: things that are done justly and unjustly.  This 
view, as far as everything else goes, is valid not just for 
justice but in general for every other virtue. For the 
possession of a virtue means acting in a certain way, rather 
than materially carrying out certain actions. Plato himself 
insisted on this aspect on other occasions, as in the Laches, 
when he speaks of valour.3 He uses this to draw attention to 
the shortcomings of a casuistic definition of the virtues: 
there are actions which generally show certain virtues, but 
which might in some cases not do so. Plato thereby diverts 
attention from the matter to the form of the act.  Aristotle 
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was to emphasize this point more clearly by associating the 
form of acts with the moral disposition of the agent: 
"actions are called just and temperate when they are such 
that the just or temperate man may do; but the man who 
also does them as just and temperate men men do them."4 
 In the Republic, however, Socrates perseveres with 
the suggestion that the definition of justice should be 
modified, because he understands that the idea of justice 
must include all the acts of this virtue. Thus, according to 
Socrates, "this is not the definition of justice –to tell the 
truth and return what one  has received",5 as on occasions 
acting justly means that one should not give back what one 
has received.  But Polemarchus, his conversation partner at 
this point, opposes this. Calling on Simonides' authority, 
Polemarchus insists that the just action is to return to 
everyone what one owes. Without passing judgement on 
Simonides' words, Socrates can do no more than repeat his 
difficulty concerning the way of interpreting these words: 
I must admite, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. 
For he is a wise and inspired man. But just what he may mean by this 
you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not 
mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit to anyone 
whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet 
what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not?6 
The difficulty outlined by Socrates finds no 
satisfactory solution in the dialogue. In other places, Plato 
sets out the problem in a slightly different way: conflating 
the virtues and the arts almost entirely,7 he understands that 
both have a single proper end,8 which requires in practice 
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the intervention of a "royal art" which can direct the use of 
both in concrete cases.9  This "royal art" which Plato 
mentions consists of "knowing how to use", which partly 
recalls Aristotle's concept of prudence. It seems clear that 
this "knowing how to use" is what Socrates felt the lack of 
in his definition of justice, when he claimed that this 
definition could cater for all possible cases. Aristotle 
resolved this problem in his own way: when he introduces 
the distinction between natural or imperfect virtue (which 
can be defined as the simple tendency to good works) and 
moral or perfect virtue, he points out that the latter cannot 
exist without prudence.10 
 To return to the main point, in the light of the 
above, what interests us here is to examine Aquinas' use of 
the example quoted by Socrates to see how far the 
philosophical issues latent in this example afford us a 
deeper understanding of the frequently contested Thomist 
doctrine of natural law.11 
 
 II. PRECEPTS AND PRACTICAL WISDOM 
One of the places in which this example appears is in 
a. 4 e to q. 94, a. 4 of the Prima Secundae to illustrate the 
sense in which natural law can be said to vary. What this 
article asks is "whether the natural law is the same for all". 
To answer this question, Aquinas begins by establishing 
one basic thesis as his starting point: "to the natural law 
belong all those things to which man has a natural 
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inclination, among which there figures as proper to man the 
fact that he inclines towards acting according to reason."12 
 As he himself states, the way by which reason itself 
proceeds entails the method of setting out from common 
principles and reaching proper, more specific conclusions, 
even though this takes place in one way for speculative 
reason, and in another for practical reason. After 
comparing the way these two types of reason proceed, 
Aquinas concludes that, in contrast to what happens on the 
speculative level, where the conclusions enjoy the same 
universality as the premises, on the practical level the 
conclusions (secondary precepts)13 do not always have the 
same validity in all circumstances. In fact, Aquinas says, if 
we are talking about "the particular conclusions of practical 
reason, truth or rectitude is not the same in all, nor is it 
equally known in those in which it is the same."14  To 
illustrate this point, he brings in the example of the 
"depositum": 
 Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason. And 
from this principle it follows as a proper conclusion that goods 
entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true 
for the majority of cases, but it may happen in a particular case that it 
would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held 
in trust; for instance if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting 
against one's country.15 
According to Aquinas, then, the secondary precepts 
of natural law may fail or miscarry ut in paucioribus not 
only as far as knowledge of them is concerned (as in the 
case of people whose inadequate disposition means that 
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they never manage to understand that some precept is 
good)16 but also as far as their reliability is concerned, sicut 
etiam naturae generabiles et corruptibiles deficiunt ut in 
paucioribus, propter impedimenta17: "in the same way that 
generable and corruptible natures are sometimes defective 
because of some impediment."  (The reference to the 
mutability of generable and corruptible natures therefore 
constitutes a key for interpreting correctly the variable 
character of natural law. We shall return to this subject 
below.)  None the less, this lack of reliability should not be 
attributed so much to the precept considered in itself, as to 
the precept seen through its application to action. This 
variation has taken place in its turn only because, in the 
action which that precept was designed to regulate, a 
"circumstance" has been introduced which notably 
modifies the object of the action itself, to the extent that 
this action can no longer be regarded in the first instance or 
exclusively as yet another case of the same precept, at least 
as long as the "perturbing" circumstances are present.  
While circumstances of this kind remain, the action has to 
be governed by a different precept which practical reason 
must determine.18 
 The fact that the secondary precepts of natural law 
are open to erroneous application demonstrates that this 
law cannot be reduced to a code of regulations, as this 
would be of less practical use. If natural law is to govern 
action effectively, it must provide us with certain 
knowledge as to what precept should be used in any 
particular case. If not, then how can we determine which 
precept to use? We must return here to the classic answer 
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that prudence, seen as a very special way of "knowing how 
to use" which does not exist without moral virtue, was for 
Aristotle the practical criterion governing action: only 
prudence equips us to discern in each case which precept 
(or habit) it is appropriate to use.19 
 For Aquinas too, prudence is at once an intellectual 
and a moral virtue: an intellectual one, because it is a way 
of knowing; and a moral one because it does not exist 
without the correctness of appetite that is the product of 
moral virtue.20  Like Aristotle, Aquinas maintains that 
prudence is an acquired virtue, 21 and frames Aristotle's 
problem concerning moral learning in a similar way: if 
moral virtue cannot exist without prudence, and prudence 
cannot exist without moral virtue, and if all these virtues 
are acquired, then how can someone act righteously?  In 
this context, it seems timely to underline that when we call 
prudence an acquired virtue, this does not rule out the 
previous existence of an imperfect form of prudence, that 
is, a more or less steady natural inclination to direct one's 
own conduct in accordance with reason. According to 
Aristotle, this inclination exists.  It is an inclination which 
does not consist simply of acting in accordance with a 
morally neutral reason,22 as for him, acting according to 
reason is the same as acting according to the virtues, to 
which we have a natural aptitude. However, to speak of an 
inclination within the reason, the reason being for Aristotle 
a potency for opposites,23 presupposes the existence of 
something that robs reason of its original 
indeterminateness. Aristotle himself did not discuss this, 
but Aquinas alludes to the problem when he mentions the 
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existence of a natural habit of the reason known as 
synderesis24 which he refers to elsewhere using the 
significant name of "the nursery of virtues". 
 Of course, the idea of a natural habit implies more 
when it comes to finding a basis for ethics.  What interests 
us here, however, is that in the operational order Aquinas 
attributes to synderesis the function of prescribing 
intellectually the ends of the virtues of practical reason, 
thus clarifying a point that Aristotle left implicit.25 Thanks 
to synderesis, then, practical reason knows two important 
things when the time comes to act: that it must act in 
accord with the ends of the virtues, and that it must avoid 
acts that are contrary to such ends.  This knowledge of the 
principles is what makes practical learning possible later, 
in that it enables people to acquire moral virtues and 
prudence.26  Moreover, this knowledge of the principles is 
what the prudent man has managed to incorporate naturally 
into his actions. 
 In Aquinas' thinking, synderesis constitutes this last 
instance which makes it possible to refer to natural law as 
something greater than a collection of codifiable precepts. 
Of course, every law, especially the natural law, is 
"something that belongs to reason"27 and not just a habit. 
For this reason, it consists properly speaking of a series of 
precepts which are ordered towards the human good.28 
However, these precepts are "promulgated" by practical 
reason to regulate our concrete action in accordance with 
certain principles that we know through a natural habit. It 
is this natural habit which so to speak "feeds" the practical 
reason, guiding it in all cases.  The fact that synderesis is a 
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habit means, among other things, that the judicial 
formulation of its contents, in the form of a code of 
precepts, will never be exhaustive.  At most, it will be able 
to indicate the normal route by which the virtues are 
acquired, and the actions which never accompany virtue. 
All this means that the precepts alone, without synderesis, 
do not constitute a definitive criterion.  There are times 
when a general precept must not be applied, as in the case 
of the borrowed sword.  To recognize such cases, it is not 
enough to have a selection of precepts: what is needed is 
the practical wisdom proper to the prudent man, who can 
judge concrete actions in the light of the principles.  The 
formulation of the precepts is always a later task, which, as 
has occasionally been noted, Aquinas does not credit with 
particular importance. That is why he does not seem 
concerned to enumerate them.  All this shows us that if we 
want to understand the way that Aquinas sees the natural 
law, we must emphasize the connection of precepts 
through a form of wisdom responsible for directing action. 
III MUTABILITY AND IMMUTABILITY OF 
NATURAL LAW 
To shed further light on the connection of the 
precepts through wisdom as a kind of last instance, we can 
subject another passage referring to Plato's example to 
scrutiny, this time from the Commentary on the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  This is the commentary on the text 
by Aristotle in which the latter asserts that "with us there is 
something that is just even by nature, yet al of it is 
changeable".29 Aquinas, like Aristotle before him, 
understands that it is important to dispute this point, as the 
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thinkers who reject the existence of something that is by 
nature just use this as support for their arguments, 
maintaining that everything that is whatever it is by nature 
is immutable, whereas what is just varies on occasions, as 
in the case of the borrowed sword. In fact, "nothing would 
seem to be more just than returning what has been 
borrowed to its owner, and yet you do not have to return a 
borrowed sword to a madman, or money for arms to your 
country's enemy."30 
 To answer this objection, Aquinas begins by 
distinguishing two types of nature: the divine nature, which 
is immutable throughout, and human nature, which dwells 
among corruptible things and which thus lies halfway 
between the two spheres: 
For us men who live among incorruptible things, there is 
certainly something natural, yet everything in us is mutable, either per 
se, like having feet, or per accidens, like having a tunic, and similarly, 
even though everything that is just for us is in some sense mutable, it is 
also true that some of these things are just by nature. 31 
It is important to distinguish between what is mutable 
per se and what is mutable per accidens, because Aquinas' 
answer goes along the lines of asserting the mutability per 
accidens of what is just by nature. In fact, one of the 
features of what is natural or secundum naturam proper to 
corruptible natures is that it occurs ut in pluribus but may 
not be borne out ut in paucioribus. According to Aquinas, 
the secondary precepts of natural law are secundum 
naturam in this sense, like generable, corruptible natures, 
in such a way that they are mutable per accidens: 
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It is manifest that also in other things that are natural for us the 
same determination is true as in the case of naturally just things; since 
those things that are natural for us are certainly the same most of the 
time, but occasionally fail.  For example, it is natural for the right side 
to be stronger than the left, even though there are some people whose 
left hand is as strong as the right and who become ambidextrous.  
Similarly, even those things which are naturally just, like returning a 
deposit, should be observed most of the time, but on occasions change 
(…).32 
The above text hints at the possibility of a change in 
human nature, something that Aquinas states more clearly 
elsewhere. What I would like to do here is consider a text 
from the Secunda Secundae referring to the mutability of 
human nature, which then goes on to use the example of 
the borrowed sword: 
That which is natural to one whose nature is unchangeable, must 
needs be such always and everywhere. But man's nature is changeable, 
wherefore that which is natural to man may sometimes fail. Thus the 
restitution of a deposit to the depositor is in accordance with natural 
equality, and if human nature were always right, this would always to 
be observed; but since it happens that man's will is unrighteous, there 
are cases in which a deposit should not be restored, lest a man of 
unrighteous will make evil use of the thing deposited: as when a 
madman or an enemy of the common weal demands the return of his 
weapons.33 
What is natural for man is modified as his nature 
undergoes modification. What is permanent is the 
relationship between nature, which is the origin, and what 
is natural, which is what is originated. It is interesting to 
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note that in the above text the reference to a possible 
perversion of the human will appears as a cause of human 
nature's lack of rectitude and, in the last instance, of the 
fact that a precept which is naturally right ceases to be so 
when it is put into practice.  On such an occasion, Aquinas 
maintains that the perversion of the human will is not only 
responsible for the defective knowledge of a precept of 
natural law, as is the case in the text of the Prima Secundae 
referred to above, but even for the fact that this precept is 
not always correct (a shortcoming that is always relative to 
the application of this precept in a given situation). 
 The term "perversion of the will" is a way of 
referring to sin, as when someone sins, the will becomes 
sick, not so much because it wants something that is 
positively bad, as because it wants something good, but the 
manner of its wanting is bad.  This is why Aquinas says 
that sin occurs praeter intentionem:34 what the agent wants 
when he/she sins is not something bad, but a given good, 
though in such a way that per accidens the will is perverted 
and is diverted away from the good apportioned to it.  In 
any case, by stating that sin has a cause per accidens, and 
that the variable correctness of the precepts of natural law 
ultimately depends on this cause per accidens, Aquinas 
excludes an essential mutation of natural law, for the same 
reason as he rules out an essential mutation of nature. 
 In fact, in Aquinas' view, nature is always a 
teleological principle which, of itself - per se - always 
strives for a good, although it sometimes, per accidens, 
gives rise to a defect.35  The same goes for the movements 
and properties we call natural, as we can see from his 
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commentary on the text in the Ethics in which Aristotle 
speaks of the right hand and the left hand. According to 
Aristotle, the right hand is stronger by nature, and this, 
which is secundum naturam, is true for the majority (ut in 
pluribus). If in other cases this is not true, then the reasons 
are accidental (per accidens), be it for natural reasons or 
through habit (because someone exercises the other hand). 
 It is clear that in this last sense (by habit) we could 
also talk of a change in the natural law (as long as this is a 
secondary precept) - exercising the other hand gives rise to 
a contrary disposition which seems to be natural. However, 
this type of change does not so much affect the correctness 
of the precepts as the knowledge and practical application 
of them. What we are interested in here is the other kind of 
variation: variation in the correctness of a precept or rather, 
variation relative to the correctness of its application in a 
given case. In this sense, there is evidence that Aquinas 
admits a certain variation analogous to that which is 
registered in the natural/physical order - a variation 
through accidental causes which, as we have read in the 
text from the Secunda Secundae, Aquinas also attributes to 
the perversion of the human will. 
 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the 
ailing will in this case is not that of the agent (e.g. the 
person who ought to act in accord with the precept of 
giving back borrowed items), but rather that of the sword's 
owner (who was to be given it back), in view of which the 
agent decides not to apply a precept which is correct in 
principle. Presuming that the sword's owner will use it 
badly, the agent decides not to return it. To the extent that 
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the bad use of something is the product of an ailing will, 
and an ailing will is nothing other than a will that has 
become used to sin, we must assert that sin has introduced 
an accidental factor to the world which the prudent man 
must not ignore when exercising his power of judgement. 
This is a factor which, for example, makes it inappropriate 
in some cases to apply the positive precept recommending 
the return of property.  Thus,  
When the thing to be restored appears to be grievously injurious 
to the person to whom it is to be restored, or to some other, it should 
not be restored to him there and then, because restitution is directed to 
the good of the person to whom is made, since all possessions come 
under the head of the useful.36 
By saying this, Aquinas is not inviting us to reason 
exclusively with regard to whatever consequences might 
follow: he adds an essential reason. For him, external 
goods are ordered by their very nature to the good of the 
body; at the same time, external goods are ordered by their 
very principle to humanity in general (if private property 
belongs to natural law, this is only because in principle, 
private property is a better way of safeguarding the 
common good). This means that external goods are also 
ordered by their very nature to usefulness or the common 
good. 
 It is vitally important to have this ordering of goods 
in mind if we are to understand why in some cases it is 
justifiable not to return a borrowed item. A careful reading 
of the versions Aquinas offers of a possible variation in the 
rightness of the precept of restitution will show us that all 
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cases are justified with reference to a definite practical 
damage to the common good (almost always illustrated by 
the idea of an "attack against the patria"). Plato before him 
had considered the possibility that the man who is given 
the sword back might use it against himself.37  These are 
not contradictory motives, as both the man who uses an 
external good to attack his own physical integrity and the 
man who uses it against the common good are 
contradicting the natural use of goods which is 
presupposed in the exercise of justice.38 According to this, 
returning the borrowed sword in certain cases would mean 
betraying the very essence of justice. In effect, this virtue 
cooperates with the human good, by guaranteeing that in 
human relationships each person wants everyone to have 
his/her own property, in the conviction that having one's 
own things is good for everyone.  In our example, keeping 
the precept of restitution would mean attacking the very 
essence of justice, because giving the madman his sword 
back would mean giving him the opportunity to misuse it 
by doing harm to himself and to others.  Naturally, if we 
are to take this decision, and deprive someone of 
something that in principle belongs to him, then we must 
have well-grounded reasons. Where such reasons are not 
present, the just action is always to return the sword. 
 In principle, all this is in keeping with Aquinas' 
thesis that the lack of rightness of a precept goes back to 
the perversion of the human will. We have seen repeatedly 
that, considered in themselves, all the precepts that derive 
from the first principles are correct. Any possible lack of 
rectitude would depend on their application to certain 
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actions which appear to come under the heading of that 
precept, but which really do not, because the course of the 
action has been crossed by some circumstance which 
actually turns round the meaning of the precept if it is 
applied. If the precept is of itself ordered to justice, the 
presence of this circumstance will rightly make us fear that 
justice itself would not be a good, should that precept be 
applied. The only thing capable of inverting the sense of a 
precept which is good per se is a bad use of the precept on 
the part of a will.  For this reason, Aquinas states that these 
"perturbing" circumstances depend on the perversion of the 
human will. In this sense, if there were no sin, all precepts 
would be universally applicable, as such circumstances 
would not arise.39 
 Thus the variation in the rightness of a precept 
depends on accidental causes. This would seem also to be 
confirmed in Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's text, as 
there Aquinas echoes word for word the comparison which 
Aristotle draws between the mutability of physical nature 
(illustrated by the example of the hand) and the mutability 
of what is just by nature. Just as the right hand is stronger 
by nature, but this may not be the case per accidens, so the 
secondary precepts of natural law are right by nature (in 
themselves and in their application) but can vary per 
accidens, for accidental reasons. 
 However, according to Aquinas this mutability has 
a limit, as does the mutability of human nature. Continuing 
the analogy with the natural-physical order, Aquinas 
expresses this limit as follows: 
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And given that the essences of mutable things are themselves 
immutable, if there is something natural in us which belongs to the 
very essence of man, this cannot vary in any way: for example, that 
man is an animal; however, what follows nature, for example, the 
dispositions, actions and movements, changes from time to time.  
Similarly, those things which belong to the very essence of justice 
cannot change in any way, for example, that one must not steal, as this 
is to commit an injustice; however, what follows from this may change 
from time to time.40 
In both the natural-physical and the natural-moral 
order, it is necessary not to lose sight of a fundamental 
metaphysical distinction which is the very reason why 
Aquinas was able to maintain the essential immutability of 
the natural law, at the same time as he accounts for the 
variable reliability of the secondary precepts.41 This 
distinction is between what, in the order of essence, 
belongs to human reason, and what is the consequence of 
essence in the order of performance. What belongs to 
human reason per se is mutable: some things are mutable 
per se, others per accidens. Among the first, to borrow an 
example from Aquinas, there is the fact of possessing a 
tunic. Among the second, there is the fact of having feet. 
Analogously, what belongs per se to the reason of justice is 
immutable, whereas what is a consequence of the reason of 
justice is mutable - some things per se (like what is legally 
just) and others per accidens (like what is naturally just). 
 Among "what is a consequence of the reason of 
justice" there figures the precept of returning borrowed 
items,42 a precept of natural law which does not have 
universal validity, only general validity, ut in pluribus.  We 
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have already seen why this is: on some occasions this 
precept may not be just, not so much because of the precept 
itself, as because circumstances may be present at the time 
of action which are not normally taken into account when 
considering things only from the point of view of what is 
generally just. So to be able to judge whether or not it is 
rational to apply the precept in given circumstances, it is 
necessary to understand the good towards which this 
precept is ordered, and the way in which this good plays a 
part in the integrity of the human good. This is what the 
prudent man does. 
 What the prudent man assumes in his judgement is 
that, on the one hand, the precepts are not irrational, but 
obey principles, and on the other, that these principles are 
accessible to us. This last condition is always fulfilled 
because, as we have seen before, such principles are 
contained in natural reason or synderesis. And it is to this 
very synderesis, through which we learn the ends of all the 
virtues and therefore also of the "reason of justice", that 
Aquinas attaches the essential immutability of the natural 
law. In fact, according to Aquinas, synderesis is never 
extinguished,43 which is compatible with two of his other 
statements: on the one hand, that the light of synderesis is 
the light of the agent intellect itself, which is numbered 
among the incorruptible natures, and on the other, that 
synderesis is the basis for the reason of justice, which, as 
we have seen, is also immutable. 
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IV. TYPES OF ACTION 
Synderesis is the habit of the practical first principles. 
These principles are immutable. To the extent that the 
agent keeps the principles, the "seed-bed of the virtues", 
when he acts, his action will be good/virtuous. If the 
opposite is the case, his action will be bad, and it will 
constitute vice.  Good acts can be divided into types, as 
different specific virtues exist, and can become the object 
of positive precepts which are valid semper sed non ad 
semper: semper because one must always act secundum 
virtutem; sed non ad semper for the simple reason that we 
cannot fulfil all the precepts under all circumstances. Nor 
is it necessary to do this. What we must do is act 
virtuously, and to do this is it necessary to discern when 
one precept should be applied, and when another.  And this 
is the task which falls to prudence. 
 None the less, as Finnis has emphasized,44 the 
nature of negative precepts is quite different, as they are 
valid semper et ad semper. There are acts which must 
never be performed, because they themselves entail a 
contradiction of the principles. To continue using our own 
example about justice, it is one thing to prescribe an action 
like returning borrowed items because it is an act of justice 
(leaving open the possibility that in some concrete case, in 
Aquinas' view because of sin, it is not), and quite another 
thing to prohibit theft absolutely, because stealing is 
always and in all circumstances an act which runs counter 
to justice (and this can also be said of keeping other 
people's property).45 
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 What is permanent in both cases is the principle of 
the "essence of justice", which is nothing other than the 
very essence of the virtue of justice, that is, the habitual 
disposition of the will by which we wish to give each 
person what is his.  For this very reason, even when in a 
particular case the appropriate action is not to return the 
borrowed item, the will to do justice must remain intact, 
which means that there must be a desire to give it back 
when circumstances return to normal. So after pointing out 
the possible "exception" to the precept of restitution, 
Aquinas concludes: 
Yet he who retains another's property must not appropriate it, 
but must either reserve it, that he may restore it at a fitting time, or 
hand it over to another to keep it more securely.46 
This serves to bring out an aspect of Aquinas' moral 
doctrine which has occasionally been obscured, but which 
is of prime importance: rather than being a morality of 
precepts, Thomist morality is a morality of virtues, for one 
basic reason - because it is the function of virtue (not only 
human virtue but all supernatural virtue) to rectify the 
human will. As Aristotle writes, "all virtue perfects the 
condition of the person whose virtue it is, and makes him 
perform his operation well."47  According to this, human 
virtue is what makes man act according to his specific 
nature: it is what makes a man into a good man.  If we lose 
sight of this, it is easy to end up with a rationalist vision of 
Aquinas' morality, which has often been the case in modern 
treatises on morality, and even in the manuals of this 
century.48 
22 
 
 
 At the heart of a rationalist view of ethics there are 
often "conflicts" between precepts which do not appear in 
an ethics based on virtues. Thus using one good habit 
instead of another, for example liberality instead of justice, 
does not contradict the essence of the moral virtue when 
this use is governed by prudence. The only thing that 
contradicts the essence of moral virtue is any act which, in 
its very structure, includes a contradiction to any virtue, 
because this kind of contradiction perverts good will, 
which is central to moral action.49   
Understanding the nature of moral virtue and its 
central role in ethics is in itself a hermeneutic key that can 
be used to interpret properly those cases which seem at 
first sight to be "exceptions to the law", like the case of the 
borrowed sword. If we bear in mind the unity of the 
virtues, it is clear that acting counter to justice is different 
from acting according to criteria that are higher than 
justice.  Not everyone who does not practise the habit of 
justice (by which we wish to give everyone his/her own 
property) acts against this habit: there are times when it is 
appropriate to apply another habit, and by doing so one is 
not failing in justice. It would not occur to anyone to say 
that, for example, being generous or showing solidarity 
constitutes a lack of justice. Yet it is obvious that in this 
case we are not giving "each man his own", at least not in 
the literal sense of the expression.  In other cases, it is 
perfectly possible for the practical reason to prescribe such 
an action to someone with particular urgency, simply 
because what is at stake is, according to moral wisdom, not 
some precept or other, but the good of man. 
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 V. GNOME AND EPIEIKEIA 
 Prudence and moral virtue are what the agent needs 
in order to act well in practice: moral virtue which rectifies 
his ends (so that he can deliberate correctly), and prudence 
so as to consider the circumstances and prescribe the most 
appropriate act in each case. With this very aim in mind, 
Aquinas mentions three potential virtues in prudence: 
eubulia, by which the deliberation preceding the precept of 
prudence is perfected,50 and synesis and gnome, by which 
the judgement of prudence is perfected.51  The difference 
between the latter two (synesis and gnome) lies in the fact 
that the first judges those cases which fit easily under the 
general headings, and the second is used in cases which do 
not obey the general rules: 
It happens sometimes that something has to be done which is not 
covered by the common rules of actions, for instance in the case of the 
enemy of one's country, when it would be wrong to give him back his 
deposit, or in other similar cases. Hence it is necessary to judge of such 
matters according to which synesis judges: and corresponding to such 
higher principles it is necessary to haave a higher virtue of judgment, 
which is called gnome, and which denotes a certain discrimination of 
judgment.52 
Gnome, which is the virtue that perfects the 
judgement prior to the precept of prudence in those matters 
which are not covered by the general rule, is also a 
necessary virtue to exercise epieikeia. In recent years, 
epieikeia has been the object of increasing attention,53 
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because it has often been interpreted as being in conflict 
with the idea of a natural law of universal validity. In this 
respect, it is useful to remember that in Aquinas' thought, 
epieikeia is above all a virtue which, like any other, 
presupposes respect for the ends generally known through 
synderesis and which can therefore never be counter to the 
reason of justice. 
 The object of this virtue is the equitable which, as 
Aristotle explains, is "just, but not the legally just, but a 
correction of legal justice."54  What is presumed is that the 
literal application of the law might turn out to be unjust.  
Thus epieikeia is the virtue which makes it possible to 
rectify possible injustices resulting from applying the law 
literally in all cases.55  This description of epieikeia concurs 
with what Aristotle says in his Rhetoric, where he contrasts 
epieikeia with legal justice, because he is taking the latter 
in its literal sense.56 
 Aquinas distinguishes two ways of referring to 
epieikeia according to whether legal justice is regarded as 
the law in its purely literal sense, or as including the 
intention of the legislator.57 In the former case, epieikeia is 
distinguished from legal justice, which it governs. In the 
latter case, it is not: epieikeia itself is part of legal justice. 
The following text from the Commentary on the Ethics 
seems to reflect the first sense best: 
That which is equitable is certainly something just, but not like 
what is legally just, but like a certain direction of what is legally just.  
In fact, it has been said to be contained within what is naturally just, 
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from which what is legally just takes its origin; and each thing is born 
to be directed according to its principle.58 
However, whether we say that epieikeia can be 
distinguished from legal justice or not, what is certain is 
that it is responsible for rectifying the injustices occasioned 
by literal applications of the law, and this by virtue of its 
referring back to the principle of law itself. At this point, to 
avoid unnecessary arguments about the scope of epieikeia, 
it is necessary to look back at how Aquinas envisaged the 
relationship between natural law and positive law. In 
concrete, we have to remember that first and foremost for 
Aquinas, both originate in the same source - the reason of 
justice - even though they emanate in different ways.59  We 
should also note that in the Thomist view, what is just by 
nature - and therefore, natural law - includes obedience to 
positive law; and that positive law is only just if it adheres 
to the principles of natural law. This apparently circular 
argument becomes clear if we distinguish between 
principles of law on the one hand, and the conclusions and 
resolutions of law on the other.  For Aquinas, natural law 
includes the principles, on the one hand, and on the other, 
all the precepts which derive directly from the principles: 
these precepts are conclusions of the principles, and as 
such are known as secondary precepts. Positive law also 
originates in these principles, but it decides or specifies the 
way in which they are to be put into practice in a particular 
society and particular circumstances. 
 Since this is the case, it would appear to be obvious 
that it is impossible to draw a clear dividing line between 
natural law and positive law: natural law is embodied in 
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positive law. Living positive law is usually the same as 
living natural law. This is the reason why we are bound by 
conscience to obey the law. The problem raised here - that 
of the unjust law - falls outside the scope of epieikeia. 
Aquinas offers a series of criteria for discerning unjust 
laws.60  None the less, when he writes of epieikeia he does 
so on the basis that the laws are just.  In this context he 
asserts repeatedly that the purpose of epieikeia is not to call 
into question the rightness of the law, which he does not 
doubt, but only to judge whether, in some particular case, it 
is just to apply it literally.  To do this, it has to judge this 
case in the light of the principles of law, that is, in the light 
of the essence of justice. 
 For this very reason, it is immaterial whether the 
case in question is supposed to be governed by a secondary 
principle of natural law or a principle of positive law. After 
all, these are not distinguished from the point of view of 
the use made of them by the agent, but only in the means 
by which this principle proceeds. It would be quite another 
thing to apply epieikeia to the principles of law themselves: 
this goes against the very concept of epieikeia, as if it is a 
virtue, it cannot exist away from those principles.61  But as 
this is a conclusion of natural law, Aquinas has no 
objection to discussing epieikeia.  This is what he does 
when he applied it to the precept of restitution, which is a 
(secondary) precept of natural law, independently of the 
fact that its formulation as a law has to be attributed to a 
human legislator: 
Since human actions, with which laws are concerned, are 
composed of contingent singulars and are innumerable in their 
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diversity, it was not possible to lay down rules of law that would apply 
to every single case. Legislators in framing laws attend to waht 
commonly happens: although if the law be applied to certain cases it 
will frustrate the equality of justice and be injurious to the common 
good, which the law has in view. Thus the law requires deposits to be 
restored, because in the majority of cases this is just. Yet it happens 
sometimes to be injurious –for instance, if a madman were to put his 
sword in deposit, and demand its delivery while in a state of madness, 
or if a man were to seek the return of his deposit in order to fight 
against his country. In these and like cases it is bad to follow the law, 
and it is good to set aside the letter of the law and to follow the dictates 
of justice  and the common good (sequi id quod poscit iustitiae ratio et 
communis utilitas). This is the object of epiekeia which we call eqiuty. 
Therefore it is evident that epieikeia is a virtue.62 
Like Aristotle, Aquinas insists that epieikeia does not 
conspire against the law, which is good in itself, as long as 
it is directed towards the common good,63 nor does it speak 
of a defect in the legislator, who introduced the law 
because of what happens ut in pluribus regarding a specific 
matter. Indubitably, the need for epieikeia implies some 
kind of deficiency, but this is an intrinsic shortcoming of 
the very nature of human acts,64 which are not always of 
the same kind: "just as returning a borrowed item is just in 
itself, and good most of the time, it may also be bad in 
some cases, for example, if a sword is returned to a 
madman."65 
According to the text quoted, the possibility of 
disagreement between the letter of the law and the 
intention of the legislator lies in the contingency of human 
actions itself. Earlier, we saw that Aquinas attributes this 
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disagreement to the disorder introduced to the world by a 
bad will, as the negative use which is practically sure to 
result from returning the sword in such cases is something 
that depends on the will.  In any case, it is patent that the 
defect in question is not in the law itself, about whose 
goodness epieikeia does not judge. Epieikeia confines itself 
to evaluating the advisability of applying the law literally 
in certain problematic cases,66 which it does by reference to 
the essence of justice,67 a principle generally known 
through synderesis. This reference to synderesis is what, in 
the last instance, justifies the application or non-application 
of a positive secondary precept, and which in all cases 
justifies the universal validity of the prohibitions against 
intrinsically evil acts. 
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